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Abstract
In this brief note, we highlight some difficulties that can arise when
fitting a continuous, symmetric, unimodal distribution to a set of expert’s
judgements. A simple analysis shows it is possible to fit a Cauchy distri-
bution to an expert’s beliefs when their beliefs actually follow a normal
distribution. This example stresses the need for careful distribution fitting
and for feedback to the expert about what the fitted distribution implies
about their beliefs.
Keywords: Distribution fitting, expert elicitation, heavy-tailed distribution,
prior misspecification.
1 Elicitation
In the context of statistical analysis, elicitation is the process of translating some-
one’s beliefs about some uncertain quantities into a probability distribution. An
elicited probability distribution is often used as a prior distribution in a Bayesian
analysis. In some application areas, there are few or no data available and expert
opinion becomes paramount in the decision making process. See Ang and Buttery
(1997), Coolen et al. (1992) and Chaloner and Rhame (2001) for examples in nu-
clear safety, engineering and clinical trials respectively.
Elicitation is far from being a precise science. It can be difficult for experts
to articulate their beliefs. There are also other complications due to the possible
biases of the experts and the biases created by the questioning process. The
process of questioning people about their beliefs is certainly not a new subject:
it has been the focus of many psychological studies. Reviews of the psychological
literature from a statistical viewpoint can be found in Kadane and Wolfson (1998)
and O’Hagan et al. (2006). In this note, we use a simple example to show the
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implications to prior modelling of an expert’s inability to articulate their beliefs
with absolute precision. Throughout this note, we assume that the expert being
questioned is female for ease of exposition and that there is a facilitator of the
elicitation process conducting the elicitation exercise.
2 Fitting distributions to percentile judgements
The expert’s beliefs for some continuous quantity X are to be modelled. Her
density function for X is then f(X). The facilitator elicits information from her
about f(.). She is not expected to accurately report the value of f(θ) for all
possible values of θ. In fact, she should not be expected to be able to report f(θ)
for any value of θ. Kadane and Wolfson (1998) suggest that quantiles or prob-
abilities should be elicited, and, often, the expert is comfortable only providing
the median and quartiles.
For X , the expert is able to give the facilitator the following judgements:
P (X < −0.6745) = 0.25, P (X < 0) = 0.5 and P (X < 0.6745) = 0.75; these
are obviously the median and quartiles of the standard normal distribution. In
addition to this, suppose that she is happy for the facilitator to assume that her
density for X is unimodal. From the quartile judgements, a symmetric distribu-
tion would be an appropriate fit to her judgements. There are infinitely many
distributions that would satisfy these conditions. In Figure 1, three possible
cumulative distribution functions that interpolate her judgements precisely are
plotted. The three distributions have widely varying tail-behaviours .
In this example, we could try to discriminate between the possible fits by
eliciting more judgements from the expert. Several methods have been pro-
posed to get information about the tails of an expert’s distribution: tail ra-
tios are discussed in Kadane et al. (1980) and hypothetical data are discussed
in Garthwaite and Al-Awadhi (2001). In these methods, further judgements are
required from the expert in order to discover more about the tails of the distri-
bution: in Kadane et al. (1980), a judgement about the 90th percentile are used
to help characterise tail-behaviour. In our example, we suppose that the expert
is able to specify P (X < −1.2816) = 0.1 and P (X < 1.2816) = 0.9 in addition
to her earlier judgements.
If we are uncertain as to whether the reported ith percentile is in fact the
expert’s (i−2.5)th percentile or the (i+2.5)th percentile, then we should take ac-
count of this uncertainty. In fact, in many cases, the expert is only expected to be
able to make probability judgements up to a precision of 0.05 (see O’Hagan et al.,
2006, for examples). In addition to this, we may suspect that she may only be
able to give judgements about X to within ±0.05. This seems reasonable as
this creates an interval that is a tenth of the her ‘true’ distribution’s standard
deviation.
The graph in Figure 2 shows the results of fitting distributions to the expert’s
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Figure 1: The dots are the expert’s judgements and the three lines are possible
fits: normal (solid), t with 5 degrees of freedom (dotted) and Cauchy (dashed).
judgements where independent uniform distributions are used to represent our
uncertainty about the judgements. It is clear that we still could fit practically
any unimodal symmetric distribution to her judgements. The true situation may
be worse than what is depicted here as it is reasonable to expect the uncertainty
to grow as she makes judgements further into the tails of her distribution.
3 Summary
Similar fitting procedures using percentile judgements are common in Bayesian
analyses; normal distributions were fitted to this type of expert judgement in
Cooke and Slijkhuis (2003), Denham and Mengersen (2007) and Kennedy et al.
(2008). It is clear from the example of the previous section that the facilitator
should check the sensitivity of their results to the possible tail-behaviours. Often,
we suspect that the tail behaviour will make little difference; however, if there are
no data or the data are far from what is expected a priori, then the tail-behaviour
in the elicited prior could have serious implications (see Andrade and O’Hagan,
2006).
The models for eliciation described in O’Hagan and Oakley (2004) and Gosling et al.
(2007) begin to address some of the uncertainties in the elicitation process; more
specifically, the facilitator’s uncertainty in the choice of distribution to fit. How-
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Figure 2: The rectangles represent uniform uncertainty about the expert’s five
judgements and the three lines are possible fits: normal (solid), t with 5 degrees
of freedom (dotted) and Cauchy (dashed).
ever, uncertainty about the precision of the expert’s judgements is not given full
attention. One way to help prevent misrepresentation of an expert’s beliefs is to
include feedback stages in the elicitation exercise. During the feedback stage, the
expert is shown the implications of using a particular distribution (for example,
the tertiles of the fitted distribution) and asked if they wish to revise her original
judgements and/or make additional judgements. Unfortunately, this additional
procedure cannot eliminate the expert’s inability to specify her judgement’s with
absolute precision. In conclusion, we reiterate that elicitation is not a precise
science, and, in order to make progress, more effort should be made to develop
elicitation models that accommodate all the forms of uncertainty that are clearly
present in elicitation.
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